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This paper estimates the macroeconomic eect of labor market
programs on labor force participation. Labor market programs could
counteract business-cycle variation in the participation rate that is
due to the discouraged-worker eect, and they could prevent labor
force out
ow. An equation that determines the participation rate
is estimated with GMM, using panel data (1986-1998) for Sweden's
municipalities. The results indicate that labor market programs have
relatively large and positive eects on labor force participation. If
the number of participants in labor market programs increases tem-
porarily by 100, the labor force increases immediately by around 63
persons. The eect is temporary so the number of participants in
the labor force returns to the old level in the next period. If the
number of participants in programs is permanently increased, the
labor force increases by about 70 persons in the long run.
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31 Introduction
Sweden's labor force participation rate (the number of persons in the labor
force relative to the number of persons in the working age population) de-
creased sharply in the 1990s, from on average 84 % during the late 1980s
to 79 % in the 1990s. This decrease in the participation rate occurred
while the unemployment rate, measured in terms of the working age pop-
ulation, increased from on average 2 % to almost 6 %. A large increase in
the number of persons participating in labor market programs paralleled
the rise in unemployment. The number of participants in labor market
programs in relation to the working age population rose from around 1 %
in the late 1980s to more than 3 % in the 1990s.
Part of the large increase in labor market programs has been evaluated,
see the overview by Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemstr om (2002). Results
from studies of macro-economic eects of labor market programs on the
Swedish labor market indicate that labor market programs aect labor de-
mand. For example, Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) nd signicant direct
displacement eects on regular employment from use of labor market pro-
grams. The results in Forslund and Kolm (2000) indicate that the number
of persons in labor market programs does not aect wage setting. This
study focuses on eects of programs on labor supply. This question has
become more important in recent years, when labor shortage has been a
problem - not high unemployment as in the early the 1990s. One posi-
tive eect of labor market programs is that they could prevent labor force
out
ow, which could be important as Sweden's labor force is expected to
decrease, because of the demographic structure.
Labor market programs may aect the labor force participation in sev-
eral ways: (1) programs could aect income of the unemployed. For some
programs, program participants are paid more than the unemployment
benets; (2) programs could result in a higher job-oer probability, by, for
example, aecting participants qualications and thus increasing future
income; (3) programs have been used to qualify for new periods of unem-
ployment benets. Taken together, programs could increase labor force
participation, because they directly or indirectly could increase income
and thus the value of labor force participation. Labor market programs
have been used extensively in Sweden, so their eect on participation could
be non-negligible.
Labor force participation data have a clear pattern, where changes in
4the participation rate are strongly and positively correlated with changes
in employment, which indicates strong business-cycle variation in the par-
ticipation rate. Flows between nonparticipation and employment are also
pro-cyclical. Business-cycle variation in real wages in Sweden is relatively
small, so shocks to real wages could not be the only explanation behind
pro-cyclical movements of the participation rate. The discouraged-worker
eect is a candidate for explaining business-cycle 
uctuation in the partic-
ipation rate. According to the discouraged-worker eect, the participation
rate will decrease when it is dicult to get a job and increase when it is
easy to nd a job so that people move in and out of labor force - depend-
ing on the state of the business cycle. Labor market programs can reduce
variation in labor force participation that is due to the discouraged-worker
eect because programs are typically counter-cyclical.
Empirical studies indicate that the discouraged worker eect is present.
The eect of labor market programs on labor force participation has not
been studied internationally, but some attempts were made on Swedish
data. Using Swedish time series data, Wadensj o (1993) nds that un-
employment and labor market programs aect the change in labor force
participation. Labor market programs have a positive eect and unem-
ployment has a negative eect on labor force participation. He concludes
that more studies must be done because the estimated sizes of the ef-
fects are sensitive to the specication and to the included trend term in
the equation. Using Swedish time series data, Johansson and Markowski
(1995) estimate an equation for the change in labor force participation rate
with the change in regular employment and the change in labor market
programs - divided by the change in the working-age population. Both
employment and labor market programs have a positive eect on labor
force participation. Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) estimate direct dis-
placement eects of labor market programs in Sweden, and their results
indicate that labor market programs are increasing labor force participa-
tion, because the estimated displacement eect is larger when employment
is divided by labor force than when divided by population. Taken together,
empirical results on Swedish data indicate that the state of the business
cycle and labor market programs have eects on labor force participation.
This paper estimates the macro-economic eect of labor market pro-
grams on labor force participation. Swedish empirical results, regarding
the eect of labor market programs on labor force participation, are either
obtained indirectly, as in Dahlberg and Forslund (1999), or obtained using
5time series data. In this study, the focus is on eects on the participation
rate during the extreme labor market situation in the 1990s. The data
set is richer than those used by Johansson and Markowski (1995) and
Wadensj o (1993), and instrument variables are used in the estimation.
The rest of the paper is organized like this: Section 2 presents the
theoretical background for the estimations. Section 3 contains a descrip-
tion of the data, and Section 4 contains the estimation results. Section 5
presents a discussion of the results.
2 The theoretical model
This section presents a theoretical model for how the labor force partic-
ipation decision is determined. In the empirical analysis, the theoretical
implications are used to suggest which variables to include in the estima-
tion and to determine the theoretical eect on participation rate. The
model is based on Holmlund and Lind en (1993) and Calmfors and Lang
(1995), and extended with endogenously determined labor force participa-
tion, as in Pissarides (1990). Holmlund and Lind en (1993) and Calmfors
and Lang (1995) study the macroeconomic eects of labor market pro-
grams. In Holmlund and Lind en, participants in programs are assumed to
search less eectively than the openly unemployed. In Calmfors and Lang
programs prevent lower search eectiveness. Here, the search eectiveness
of program participants is unrestricted.
It is assumed that individuals compare the value of non-participation
with the value of labor force participation when deciding whether or not
to participate in the labor force. Nonparticipants decide to participate in
the labor force if the value of participating is greater than the value of
nonparticipation. Likewise, participants decide to leave the labor force if
the value of nonparticipation is greater than the value of participating.
More people will participate in the labor force if the value of participation
increases. Working hours are assumed to be xed.1.
The value of nonparticipation is for example the value of leisure, the
value of education, or values of other activities in which nonparticipants
are engaged. The value of nonparticipation, li, consists of two parts: (1)
one common component, f(z), that describes the impacts of variables out-
1The reason for this assumption is that in the empirical analysis data on number of
hours worked are not available.
6side the theoretical model, for example age, number of children and supply
of day-care services; (2) one individual-specic component, modelled as a
stochastic shock to preferences, which is uniformly distributed between
min and max. The value of nonparticipation for an individual is
li = f(z) + i: (1)
It is assumed that f0(z) is positive2. i is the realization of the individual-
specic shock. The labor force participant who is indierent between labor
force participation and nonparticipation has li = ; where  is the value
of participating in labor force and  the discount factor. The cut-o value,
; for the marginal participant is given by
 =    f(z): (2)
The number of participants is the integral of the density function for  up









 is assumed to be uniformly distributed, so the solution to equation
(3) is the participation rate. The participation rate is the number of par-
ticipants in labor force, lf =    min, divided by the number of persons
in the working age population, pop = max   min. Substitute the expres-
sion for  in equation (2) in equation (3) to express the participation rate




   f(z)   min
max   min
: (4)
The participation rate depends positively on the discounted value of par-
ticipating in labor force, : The eect of f(z) on the participation rate is
negative, because f0(z) is assumed to be positive and f(z) and  do not
contain the same variables.3. To summarize, the model predicts that the
2This assumption is not restrictive because variables that increase value of leisure
could be included in the z-vector with a negative sign.
3If  and f(z) contain the same variables, it is assumed that the positive eect of
variables in  is small relative to the negative eect of f(z): In a model with endoge-
nously determined value of leisure, the value of leisure depends on parameters in the
utility function. The value of leisure will be increasing in wealth; a variable that could
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Figure 1: The states and 
ows in the labor market for labor force partic-
ipants
participation rate increases in the same variables that increase the value
of labor force participation, :
Figure 1 describes the states and 
ows in the labor market for labor
force participants. The number of persons in each state is expressed in
terms of the working-age population, and the population is assumed to be
xed. Labor force participants could be employed, e, openly unemployed,
u, or participating in labor market programs, r. The states and the 
ows
are the same as in Holmlund and Lind en (1993).
The job separation rate is denoted  and represents exogenously given
negative shocks to the rms that result in decreased regular employment.
A fraction (1   ) of the number of persons that are separated from a
job become unemployed, and a fraction  is placed in a program.4 The
probability of getting a place in a program if openly unemployed is 
, and
the probability of becoming unemployed after program participation is :
The rms are opening vacancies, and the openly unemployed and par-
ticipants in labor market programs search for vacant jobs.5 The number
of matches depends on the number of vacancies and on the number of
searchers, that is, the number of openly unemployed and participants in
labor market programs. Increased labor market tightness, , (the number
of vacancies divided by the number of searchers) increases the probability
of getting a job oer, ():6
4It is possible to go directly from regular employment to a program. This is so be-
cause data are yearly and sometimes only a short period of unemployment was required
to be eligible to participate in a program.
5There is no on-the-job search in the model.
6To see this, assume that the number of hirings is determined by h = h(v;s) =
8The probability of getting a job diers between the unemployed and
the participants in labor market programs; the c parameter captures this
dierence. If c is greater than one, labor market programs have positive
eects on the job-oer probability for the program participants compared
to the openly unemployed. If c is less than one, program participants
have smaller chances of getting a job oer than the openly unemployed.
One reason could be that program participants search less than openly
unemployed.
The discounted value of the dierent states (employment, e, open
unemployment, u, and program participation, r) is computed as the
discounted income in each state - accounting for the probability of chang-
ing state and the income in the new state.
e = [w + (1   )(u   e) + (r   e)] (5)
r = [rw + c(e   r) + (u   r)] (6)
u = [uw + (e   u) + 
 (r   u)] (7)
Employed workers earn w and the conditional probabilities of open
unemployment or participation in a program are (1   ) and . Par-
ticipants in labor market programs earn rw and with probabilities c and
 they become employed or openly unemployed. Openly unemployed earn
uw, and with probabilities  and 
 they become employed or placed in
a labor market program. Equations (5)-(7) are used to calculate the value
h(v;cr + u): The number of vacancies, v, and the number of eective searchers, s =
cr + u; increase the matching function. Assume that all hirings come from the stock of
searchers, h = s = (cr + u). Then, the job oer arrival rate is  = h=s = h(v;s)=s.
If constant returns to scale is assumed for the h-function, we can express the job oer
probability  as a function of labor market tightness,  = v=s: With constant returns
to scale  = h(v;s)=s = h(v=s;1) = h(;1) = (), where  = v=s, is the labor market
tightness. The job-oer probability  is increasing in labor market tightness .
9of the states for labor force participants.7
Program participants accept a job oer if the value of employment
is greater than the value of participating in a program, e > r. The
condition is:
(1   )(r   u) + ( + 
 + )(r   1) + (r   1) 6 0 (8)
In the most realistic case when u 6 r 6 1, the condition could be
violated if the dierence between the replacement rates is large enough.
If u < r = 1, the condition in (8) is satised if (1   ) > ; so the

ow from employment into unemployment must be greater than or equal
to the 
ow from programs into unemployment. For the special case when
r = u = , the condition in (8) is satised if  6 1:
Unemployed accept a place in a program if r > u: The condition is:
( + )(r   u) + ((r   1)   c(u   1)) > 0 (9)
When r = u < 1, the condition in (9) is satised if c > 1: The
parameter c captures all dierences in the probability of getting a job-
oer between program participants and openly unemployed. The job-oer
probability for program participants has to be at least as large as for
openly unemployed, because the replacement rates, and therefore income,
is the same. On the other hand, if c < 1, program participants have to
be compensated for the decreased probability of getting a job, so r > u:
Note that if programs are used to qualify unemployed for new periods of
unemployment benets, it would increase the value of r: This eect of
programs is not included in the model.
7The expression for the values of the states are the following:
e = w()
 1 f[((1   )( + c) + )]u + [(( + ) + 
)]r +
+ [ + (c + 1) + 




 +  +  + ) + (
 + )]r +
+[( + c(1   )) + ]u + [c( +  + 
) + ]g
u = w()
 1 f[( +  +  + c) + (c(1   ) + )]u +
+[(
 + ) + 
]r + [ + c(
 + ) + ]g
where  = ( + c + )( +  + ) + 
 ( +  + c) + (1   c):
10Unemployed accepts a job oer if e > u: The condition is:
(r   u) + 
 (r   1) + ( +  + c)(u   1) 6 0 (10)
When r = u = , the condition in (10) is satised if  6 1: Taken
together, the self selection constraints imply that e > r > u. Restric-
tions on the policy parameters, ;
;;r, and u are needed to satisfy the
selection constraints.
The labor force participation rate depends positively on the value of
participating in the labor force, ; see equation (4). Flow from nonpartic-
ipation into regular employment is allowed if the value of nonparticipation
for the marginal participant is equal to the value of being employed, e:8
So the cuto value, ; in equation (2) is the value where li = e. Ta-
ble 1 displays how the values of the states in the labor market and the
participation rate are aected by changes in the model's parameter.
An increase in wages, w, increases the value of participation and thus
increases the labor force participation. The number of participants in labor




 and , have positive eects if the value of participating
in a program is larger than being openly unemployed, that is, r u > 0.
And increased out
ows from programs into unemployment, ; have nega-
tive eects if r   u > 0. It will be better to participate in a program
than being openly unemployed if obtained benets are higher when in a
program than when openly unemployed, see the selection constraint in
(9). This has been the case for some programs. Often, participants in job
creation programs are paid more than the unemployment benet, while
participants in training programs receive the unemployment benet. It
will also be better to participate in a labor market program than being
openly unemployed if programs increase the job-oer probability. Further-
more, if programs are used to qualify for new periods of unemployment
8Normally it is assumed that nonparticipants do not search for jobs. The value of
participating in the labor force, ; is then the value of unemployment, u; because
one period of unemployment - and search - is necessary to get a job-oer. Empirically,
the 
ow from nonparticipation directly to regular employment is large and procyclical
in many countries, see for example Burda and Wyplosz (1994). To allow for 
ow from
nonparticipation into regular employment, the value of participating in labor force is e.
u is the value of being registered at an employment oce. The empirical implications
are the same, irrespective of the denition of the value of labor force participation,
because the signs of the eects of changes in the model's variables are the same for all
states.
11Table 1: Eects on the labor force participation rate
Increase in Eect on
u r e participation
rate
w + + + +

 + + + + if r   u > 0
 + + + + if r   u > 0
 - - - - if r   u > 0
() + + + +
 - - - - if r;u 6 1
r + + + +
u + + + +
c + + + + if e   r > 0
benets, the value of programs relative open unemployment increases.
These direct eects of programs are positive.
An increase in labor market tightness,  = (v=(u + cr)), that is, the
number of vacancies divided by the number of eective job-searchers, in-
creases the job-oer probability. The value of being employed is higher
than the value of being unemployed or in a program. So the value of labor
force participation is increased if it is easy to nd a job. An increased
number of vacancies, v, increases the probability of nding a job and is
expected to have a positive eect on labor force participation. An in-
creased number of openly unemployed, u, increases the number of persons
searching for jobs and, for a given number of vacancies, it is now more
dicult to nd a job. So an increase in open unemployment is expected
to have a negative eect on the labor force participation rate. It is the
dependence of the job-oer probability, (), on labor market tightness
that gives rise to the discouraged worker eect in the model because labor
market tightness is pro-cyclical. An increased number of program partici-
pants increases the number of job-searchers for given numbers of vacancies
and openly unemployed and a given relative eectiveness of programs, c.
This is expected to decrease the labor force participation rate because the
probability of getting a job decreases.
An increased job separation rate, that is, negative employment shocks,
, increases the probability of being openly unemployed. This is expected
12to have a negative eect on the labor force participation rate because the
probability of getting a lower income has increased since unemployment
benets are lower than wages. r and u are the replacement rates (income
as a fraction of earnings) during program participation or unemployment.
Higher replacement rates increases the value of labor force participation
in the same way as increased wages. Finally, if labor market programs
increase the job-oer probability, which is captured by the parameter c,
an increase in labor force participation is expected, given that e r > 0.
To summarize, we would expect that higher wages, an increased num-
ber of vacancies, an increased number of labor market programs partic-
ipants, a higher level of unemployment benets, and increased job-oer
probability for program participants positively aect the labor force par-
ticipation rate. Increased unemployment and negative employment shocks
are expected to decrease labor force participation.
3 Data
The previous section concludes that the following variables should af-
fect labor force participation rate: wages, w; vacancies divided by the
working-age population, v, open unemployment divided by the working-
age population; u; the number of participants in labor market programs
divided by the working-age population, r; negative employment shocks, ,
the replacements rates, r and u, and nally the relative eectiveness of
the labor market programs, c:
The data set is a panel consisting of yearly observations from 1986 to
1998 for Sweden's municipalities. The dataset includes 3 692 observations
(13 years times 284 municipalities). Description of the dataset, summary
statistics and plots of the data are given in Appendix.
3.1 Denition of variables
The number of persons in the labor force is calculated as the sum of the
number of persons employed, unemployed and in labor market programs.
Nonparticipants are the working age population, ages 18-65, excluding
those in the labor force. With this denition, all participants in labor
market programs are in the labor force.9
9This is a dierence compared to labor force surveys, where participants in some
programs are dened as students and thus outside labor force.
13The overall wage, w, is measured by the real average annual labor
income, among the employed, in each municipality. Unemployment, u,
is measured as the number of unemployed that are registered at an em-
ployment oce divided by the working-age population. The measure of
unemployment is dierent from labor force surveys, where individuals who
search actively are regarded as unemployed.10 The number of persons reg-
istered at an employment oce is somewhat smaller than unemployment
according to labor force surveys. The aggregate time series variation is
almost the same for the two denitions of unemployment, however. Va-
cancies, v, is measured by the total number of vacancies reported to the
labor market oce divided by the working-age population. The empirical
measure of the number of vacancies covers only a part of the total number
of vacancies, because not all vacant jobs are reported to the labor market
oce.
The constant returns to scale assumption of the hiring function, h(v;cr+
u); implies that the job oer probability could be expressed as a function
of tightness, () = (v=cr + u). The constant returns to scale restric-
tion is not imposed in the estimation because the number of eective
searchers is not observable since data on c are not available. Vacancies,
v, open unemployment, u, and program participants, r; are therefore in-
cluded separately.
The parameters, 
; ; and ; describe 
ows into and out from labor
market programs. Data on gross 
ows are not available; data on stocks
are used in the estimation. Therefore, it is not possible to separate pos-
itive eects of in
ow into programs from negative eects of out
ow from
programs, because the 
ow parameters are summarized by the stock. In
general, there is no one- to- one correspondence between the stock and
the 
ow parameters in the theoretical model. In steady state, the expres-





where e is employment: It is possible to generate a simple relation between
the stocks and the 
ows where the accommodation ratio, the number of
program participants divided by the number of searchers, could be inter-
preted as the probability of being placed in a program. The accommoda-
tion ratio is not used in the estimation because strong restrictions on the

ows in and out from labor market programs are needed together with the
assumption that c = 1;implying that the probability of getting a job-oer
10Active search means that contact with an employer should have been taken during
the last four weeks.
14is the same for openly unemployed and labor market program partici-
pants.11 The number of program participants divided by the working-age
population, r, excluding participants in programs directed towards people
with disabilities, are used in the estimation. The number of participants in
labor market programs captures two eects: (1) one direct positive eect
because the value of labor market participation increases with the number
of persons in programs; and (2) one indirect negative eect through the
job-oer probability, whereby an increased number of participants in labor
market programs will increase the number of searchers, which will have a
negative competition eect for a given number of vacancies.
The negative shock to employment, , is measured by the job destruc-
tion rate. The job destruction is dened as the absolute sum of negative
employment changes in the plants in each municipality. The job destruc-
tion rate is calculated as job destruction divided by average employment
at each plant in period t and t-1. Negative employment changes are not a
perfect measure of job destruction; if the number of unlled vacancies is
increased temporarily, it is counted as a negative change in employment;
full time jobs and part time jobs can not be separated; job 
ows within
one year and substitution between jobs with dierent positions within the
plant are not considered in the calculation. Data on replacement rates,
r and u; are not available at the municipality level. So time dummies
capture the eect of unemployment benets. The eectiveness parameter,
c, and the discount factor, , are also unobservable, and captured by the
time dummies.
Some demographic variables are also included in the estimation. They
are assumed to have negative eects on the participation rate, and they are
included in the z-vector, see equation (4). These variables are the number
of persons between ages 18-24 and 55-65, in relation to the number of
persons in the working age population, ages 18-65. These age groups have
11If in
ow rates into programs are the same for openly unemployed and employed,

 =  = '; and if the probability of getting a job-oer is the same for openly unemployed
and labor market program participants, c = 1, the accomodation ratio, r=(r + u); could
be written as '
1+
'++: Restrictions on the out
ow rate from programs, ; is needed to
obtain a simpler expression. The probability of remaining in the program state, given
the job oer rate, could be restricted to be the same as the probability of entering the
program state, 1  = '. That is, the probability of getting a place in a program is the
same for unemployed, employed, and program participants. Then, the accomodation
ratio r=(r + u) is equal to the 
ow parameter '; and the accomodation ratio could be
interpreted as the probability of being placed in a program.
15lower participation rates than the average, which re
ects the number of
students among the younger and that the likelihood of early retirement
and sickness pensions increases with age.
The labor force, vacancies, unemployment, and the number of persons
in labor market programs are divided by the lagged number of persons
in the working-age population (pop1865)t 1 instead of current population,
to account for the fact that the explanatory variables could aect migra-
tion between the municipalities. For example, if the number of vacancies
increases both labor force and population, the estimated eect on the
participation rate will be lower than the eect on labor force, because
population is also increased. If migration is aected, the estimated co-
ecients will be a mixture of two eects when the variables are divided
by current population, because both the numerator and the denominator
of the dependent variable is aected. The demographic variables are di-
vided by the current working-age population, and they are included lagged
one period. All variables, except the demographic ones, are measured in
November each year. The demographic variables are based on the popu-
lation in the municipalities in December each year. Table 2 summarizes
denitions of the variables in the estimations and the expected eects on
the participation rate.
Table 2: Variable denitions
Variable Denition Eect
lf number of persons in labor forcet/pop1865t 1
w real annual income for employedt +
v number of vacanciest/pop1865t 1 +
u number of unemployedt/pop1865t 1 -
r number of persons in
labor market programst/pop1865t 1 +
jdr job destruction ratet -
p1824 number of persons 18-24 yeart/pop1865t -
p5565 number of persons 55-65 yeart/pop1865t -
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The labor force participation rate is the dependent variable in the estima-
tion, and it is allowed to be aected by wages, vacancies, open unemploy-
ment, participants in labor market programs, the job destruction rate and
the number of persons between ages 18-24 and 55-65. The model is formu-
lated in steady state and lagged variables are included in the estimation
to allow for time to adjust the labor force participation.12 Therefore, the
expected eects from the theoretical model refer to the long run eects in





















+a7p1824i;t 1 + a8p5565i;t 1 + ki + kt + "i;t;
where ki is an unobserved municipality specic eect, and kt is a time-
varying aggregate eect. The model is dierenced before estimation, al-
lowing all variables to be correlated with the unobserved municipality
specic xed eect, ki.
The demographic variables are assumed to be exogenously determined.
The economic variables could be endogenously determined, in the main
through the denition of the labor force as the sum of employed, openly
unemployed and participants in labor market programs. An IV-estimator
is also needed because of the lagged dependent variable. The GMM es-
timator for dynamic panel data models suggested by Arellano and Bond
(1991), is used in the estimation. Endogenous variables in levels in t-2 or
earlier are valid instruments for the model in dierences.
Lagged economic variables and current and lagged demographic vari-
ables are used as instruments in the estimation. Actually, the rules for
how Sweden's Labor Market Board allocates money to the local level im-
ply that lagged unemployment and lagged number of program participants
12The expression for the participation rate is a long, complicated, nonlinear function
of the variables in e. The estimated dynamic model could be interpreted as an linear
approximation of the participation rate.
17aect spending on labor market programs, see the discussion in Dahlberg
and Forslund (1999). So, use of lagged variables as instruments for the
policy variable (the number of participants in labor market programs) is
justied by the allocation of spending. One extra instrument that captures
municipality-specic employment shocks is used in the estimation. Each
industry share of employment in each municipality is calculated. Then,
the average aggregate change in employment at each two-digit industry
level is applied to the industry share of employment, lagged two periods.
4.1 Estimation results
First, a preliminary model, where all variables are included with two lags,
was estimated. The number of lags in the preliminary model is determined
as the smallest model that is accepted by the Sargan-statistic and the
correlation-test.13 Table 3 presents the estimation results. The reported
standard errors and p-values for the second-step estimation, are calculated
with the small sample correction suggested by Windmeijer (2000).14Time
dummies and a constant are included in the model. The estimation period
is 1989-1998.
First we can note that the Sargan statistic and the correlation tests
accept the model, and that the estimated coecients and standard errors
are almost the same in the rst- and second-step estimation. Insignicant
variables, at the 10 % level, were then deleted from the preliminary model.
Lagged vacancies are kept because the p-value in the rst-step estimation
is lower than 10 %. The zero-restrictions in the preliminary model that
is implied by the reduced model is not rejected by a formal test. The p-
value for a Wald test of the hypothesis of zero coecients on the variables
that are deleted from the preliminary model is 0.402 in the second-step
13The model was estimated with lags from four to zero. Models with three and two
lags are accepted by the Sargan statistic and the correlation tests. Dierence Sargan-
tests for the number of lags do not reject any of the hypothesis tested.
14The instrument matrix contains the endogenous variables at time t-2 up to t-4, the
exogenous demographic variables at t up to t-4, and the aggregate employment shock
at t. This is the smallest number of lagged endogenous variables as instruments that
is accepted by the Sargan statistic. The package DPD for Ox, see Doornik, Arellano,
and Bond (2001), is used in the estimation. The correlation tests are the m1 and m2
statistics, suggested in Arellano and Bond (1991). The dierencing of the model, due
to the xed eect, will introduce a moving average error. Therefore, the AR(1) test
should indicate correlation, while the AR(2) test should not. It is assumed that enough
lags are included in the level equation, which is assumed to have uncorrelated errors.
18Table 3: Estimation results, preliminary model
First-step estimation Second-step estimation
Variable Coe p-val SE Coe p-val SE
lft 1 0.358 0.000 0.039 0.347 0.000 0.041
lft 2 0.046 0.044 0.023 0.040 0.092 0.024
wt 0.008 0.038 0.004 0.008 0.050 0.004
wt 1 -0.007 0.121 0.004 -0.007 0.126 0.004
wt 2 -0.000 0.792 0.000 -0.000 0.773 0.000
vt 0.081 0.583 0.147 0.108 0.476 0.151
vt 1 0.152 0.077 0.086 0.137 0.117 0.088
vt 2 -0.030 0.514 0.046 -0.034 0.447 0.045
ut 0.483 0.000 0.062 0.497 0.000 0.059
ut 1 -0.524 0.000 0.058 -0.523 0.000 0.063
ut 2 -0.160 0.000 0.043 -0.145 0.001 0.044
rt 0.622 0.000 0.068 0.649 0.000 0.059
rt 1 -0.218 0.000 0.060 -0.209 0.001 0.063
rt 2 -0.048 0.277 0.044 -0.037 0.389 0.044
jdrt -0.127 0.000 0.022 -0.127 0.000 0.021
jdrt 1 -0.012 0.103 0.007 -0.012 0.076 0.007
jdrt 2 -0.000 0.986 0.006 -0.001 0.856 0.006
p1824t 1 -0.403 0.000 0.056 -0.395 0.000 0.058
p5565t 1 -0.158 0.001 0.049 -0.160 0.001 0.049
Sargan 674.4 0.000 259.6 0.392
AR(1) -10.0 0.000 -7.5 0.000
AR(2) 2.3 0.024 11.8 0.066
19estimation. The estimation results for the reduced model are presented in
Table 4.
First we can note that the second lag of the dependent variable is
insignicant, but it is included because otherwise the AR(2) test indi-
cates serial correlation. The estimated adjustment coecient is 0.60.15
As expected, the eect of the wage is positive. The number of vacancies
enters lagged one period, and as expected the eect is positive. The es-
timated contemporaneous coecient on unemployment is positive, while
the lagged and long run eects are negative. According to the theoretical
model, which is formulated in steady state, the eect of unemployment is
expected to be negative. The immediate eect of the number of partici-
pants in labor market programs is positive, the lagged eect is negative,
and the long run eect is positive, as expected. The immediate and lagged
eects of the job destruction rate are negative, as expected. And the eect
of the demographic variables, the proportions of persons ages 18-24 and
55-65 are negative, as expected.
Table 5 presents the immediate and long-term eects, together with
90 % condence intervals16. The eect of the wage is positive and signif-
icant in both the short and long run. The long-term eect of the wage
corresponds to an income elasticity of 0.049 (see Table 6). The long-term
eect of the number of vacancies is signicantly dierent from zero. The
point estimate indicates that if the number of vacancies is permanently
increased by 100, the number of participants in labor force increases by 29
persons in the long run. The estimated long-run eect of unemployment is
negative (-0.33), while the estimated immediate eect is positive. If unem-
ployment increase by 100, the number of participants in labor decreases
by 33 persons in the long run. The estimated long-run eect of unem-
ployment is about the same size as the long-run eect of vacancies with
opposite sign. The estimated long-term eect of labor market programs is
slightly higher than the immediate eect. If the number of participants in
labor market programs is increased permanently by 100, the labor force
increases immediately by 63 persons and by 70 persons in the long run.
15The adjustment coecient is calculated as one minus the sum of coecients on
lagged participation rate, that is (1-0.361-0.035). The long run eect of a variable is
calculated as the sum of the coecients on the variable divided by the adjustment
coecient.
16The calculation of condence interval is based on the adjusted standard errors in
the second step estimation.
20Table 4: Estimation results, reduced model
First-step estimation Second-step estimation
Variable Coe p-val SE Coe p-val SE
lft 1 0.362 0.000 0.039 0.361 0.000 0.039
lft 2 0.035 0.114 0.022 0.035 0.137 0.023
wt 0.004 0.071 0.002 0.004 0.083 0.002
vt 1 0.177 0.032 0.082 0.176 0.042 0.086
ut 0.487 0.000 0.059 0.483 0.000 0.058
ut 1 -0.549 0.000 0.053 -0.547 0.000 0.056
ut 2 -0.153 0.000 0.042 -0.138 0.002 0.044
rt 0.624 0.000 0.066 0.634 0.000 0.069
rt 1 -0.214 0.000 0.058 -0.212 0.000 0.059
jdrt -0.121 0.000 0.021 -0.121 0.000 0.021
jdrt 1 -0.012 0.046 0.006 -0.012 0.042 0.006
p1824t 1 -0.417 0.000 0.056 -0.409 0.000 0.057
p5565t 1 -0.158 0.001 0.049 -0.150 0.002 0.049
const -0.0045 0.000 0.0011 -0.0044 0.000 0.0011
t1990 -0.0019 0.215 0.0016 -0.0019 0.256 0.0016
t1991 -0.0203 0.000 0.0022 -0.0208 0.000 0.0023
t1992 -0.0083 0.006 0.0030 -0.0086 0.007 0.0032
t1993 -0.0241 0.000 0.0029 -0.0247 0.000 0.0031
t1994 0.0292 0.000 0.0029 0.0286 0.000 0.0032
t1995 0.0077 0.000 0.0021 0.0071 0.002 0.0023
t1996 -0.0055 0.000 0.0014 -0.0055 0.000 0.0015
t1997 -0.0068 0.000 0.0018 -0.0071 0.000 0.0018
t1998 0.0110 0.000 0.0017 0.0110 0.000 0.0017
Sargan 743.0 0.000 268.6 0.343
AR(1) -10.5 0.000 -8.1 0.000
AR(2) 2.4 0.018 1.6 0.122
21Table 5: Immediate and long run eects
Variable Immediate Long run
w 0.004 [ 0.008] [ 0.002] 0.007 [ 0.012] [ 0.003]
v - 0.291 [ 0.526] [ 0.056]
u 0.483 [ 0.579] [ 0.388] -0.332 [-0.013] [-0.677]
r 0.634 [ 0.747] [ 0.521] 0.699 [ 1.081] [ 0.317]
jdr -0.121 [-0.087] [-0.155] -0.219 [ 0.162] [-0.601]
pop1824 -0.401 [-0.316] [-0.502] -0.676 [-0.265] [-1.087]
pop5565 -0.150 [-0.069] [-0.230] -0.247 [ 0.225] [-0.720]
If a permanent increase in open unemployment is followed by a perma-
nent increase in the number of program participants by 100, the total long
run eect on labor force is 37. The estimation results indicate that labor
market programs are reducing business-cycle variation in the labor force,
because the eect is positive and programs are counter-cyclical, that is,
they tend to be increased when unemployment is high, see Figure 6. The
long-term eect of an increased number of participants in programs is
positive, which means that some labor force participants who would have
left the labor force in the absence of programs are now participating be-
cause of the programs. The estimation results suggest that if the number
of participants in programs is permanently increased, it will have a rel-
atively large eect on labor force participation. The immediate negative
eect of the job destruction rate is smaller than the long run eect, -0.12
compared to -0.22. If the number of destroyed jobs is increased by 100, 22
persons will leave labor force in the long run. The long-run eect of the
job destruction rate is not signicantly dierent from zero. And the long-
run eects of the demographic variables are negative and larger than the
short-run eects. The long-run eect of the proportion of 55 to 65 years
old is not signicantly dierent from zero, while the long-run eect of the
proportion 18 to 24 years old is signicant. To summarize, the estimated
22Table 6: Immediate and long run elasticities








long-run eects are of the expected signs, and the largest eects are found
for labor market programs and the proportion of persons between ages 18
and 24.
The implied eect of programs on regular employment and open un-
employment is -0.37 in the short run and -0.30 in the long run, which
is the eect on the labor force if all program participants are dened as
out of labor force. If open unemployment is held constant, the estimation
results also imply an indirectly estimated displacement eect. If labor
market programs increase by 100, the labor force increases immediately
by 63 persons, according to the estimated coecient. Then, the regular
employment must decrease by 37 persons, implying a short-run displace-
ment eect of 0.37. In the long run, the implied displacement eect is
0.30. Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) estimate immediate, direct, displace-
ment eects to be about 0.65 and the long-run eect to be around 0.75
for programs with subsidized employment. They also found that the dis-
placement eect of training programs is insignicant, which could partly
explain the dierence, because training programs are included in the mea-
sure of labor market programs that is used in this study. This comparison
relies on the assumption that labor market programs do not aect open
unemployment.
In Table 6, the estimates are converted into elasticities, evaluated at
the mean of the variables. In general, the estimated elasticities are small.
At the same time, the average percentage change in the labor force par-
ticipation rate is small too, -0.6 %. To illustrate the magnitudes of the
estimated eects, an experiment is carried out, where the variables are
increased permanently with one standard deviation. A one standard de-
23Table 7: Eect of changes with one standard deviation
Variable Immediate Long run
w (9%) 12 196 20 226
v (46 %) - 6 752
u (53 %) 70 333 -48 295
r (50 %) 43 325 47 744
jdr (20 %) -14 195 -25 755
pop1824 (4 %) -14 439 -23 883
pop5565 (3 %) -4 461 -7 366
viation shock is selected because it measures the size of a typical shock
during the sample period. In the experiment, employment and the number
of persons in the working age population are assumed to be constant.
From Table 7 we can note that the standard deviations are low for
the population ratios, implying that "normal" shocks are relatively small.
The standard deviations for the number of vacancies, unemployment, and
labor market programs are around 50 %, which re
ects the huge increase
in unemployment in the early 1990s. The variation in the job destruc-
tion rate and wages are about 20 and 10 %, respectively. Results from
the experiment indicate that in the long run, labor market programs and
unemployment have about the same eect but with opposite signs. So
programs could oset a permanent increase in open unemployment.
4.2 Alternative estimations
This section presents results from alternative estimations of the model to
examine if the estimation results are sensitive to estimation methods and
assumptions made in the estimation. The following potential problems
are considered:
1. The small sample performance of the estimator could be problematic
if data are persistent. The model is therefore estimated with an
alternative estimator that could perform better in small samples
when data are persistent, which is often the case with macrodata.
2. All available information are not used in the estimation because only
instrument dated t 2 to t 4 are used. The model is thus estimated
24with all available instruments to examine if the results are aected
by the choice of instruments.
3. Several assumptions are made in the estimation. In the computation
of standard errors it is assumed that the errors are independent be-
tween municipalities, although they are allowed to be heteroskedas-
tic. Furthermore, the parameters are assumed to be constant for
dierent time periods and for dierent municipalities. The assump-
tions of independent errors and constant coecients in the time and
municipality dimension are relaxed in alternative estimations.
4. The estimated coecient on labor market programs measures two
eects; one direct positive eect of the value of participating in a
program and one negative indirect negative eect of an increased
number of searchers. An attempt to distinguish the two eects from
each other is made by assigning values to an unobserved parameter.
Results with the SYS-estimator The GMM estimator for dynamic
panel data models by Arellano and Bond (1991) that is used here, could
have poor performance in small samples if the variables are persistent,
because the instruments are weak if data is highly autoregressive, see
Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
Macrodata are used in this study and they could be persistent. Blundell
and Bond (1998) propose a linear GMM estimator (SYS) as an alternative
to the Arellano and Bond (1991) rst-dierenced linear GMM estimator
(DIF), when data are persistent.17
AR(1) models, including time dummies, are estimated to examine the
rate of persistence in data.18 The point estimates could only indicate if
variables are persistent because the models are rejected by the Sargan
17The SYS-estimator uses lagged dierences as instruments for the model in levels, in
addition the instruments used by the DIF-estimator - lagged levels as instrument for the
dierences. Formally, the validity of the extra instrument used by the SYS estimator
could be tested for using a dierence Sargan test. But simulation results in Blundell,
Bond, and Windmeijer (2000) indicate that the Sargan statistic for this test could be
oversized when data are persistent. So it is dicult to reject the validity of the extra
instruments used by the SYS estimator.
18The AR(1) models are estimated with the DIF- and the SYS-estimator, with instru-
ments up to lag t-4 and all available instruments. In general, the models are rejected
by the Sargan statistic. The dierence between the estimated coecients with the DIF-
and the SYS-estimator and with dierent number of instruments is small.
25statistic. The estimation results indicate that wages may be persistent.
The labor force participation rate, unemployment, and labor market pro-
grams seem to be moderately autoregressive, with estimated autoregres-
sive coecients between 0.4 and 0.6. The autoregressive coecients on
vacancies and job destruction rate are probably small.
Table 10 in Appendix B presents the estimation results for the prelim-
inary model with the SYS-estimator. The corresponding results with the
DIF-estimator is presented in Table 3. Except for the coecients on unem-
ployment, the estimation results do not change when the SYS-estimator
is used. The estimated long run eect on open unemployment is -1.05
with the SYS-estimator compared to -0.28 with the DIF-estimator in the
preliminary model. All other point estimates of the long run eect, in-
cluding the eect of programs, are within the 90 % condence bands for
the reduced model estimated with the DIF-estimator (see Table 5).
Results with the full instrument matrix The number of lagged
instruments that is used in the estimation is the smallest number of lags
that is accepted by the Sargan statistic, which are instruments dated t-
2 to t-4. So information contained in further lags of the variables are
not used in the estimation. To examine if the parameter estimates are
sensitive to the number of instruments, the model is estimated with the
total number of instruments available, that is, all available lags for each
observation. Table 11 in Appendix B presents the estimation results of
the preliminary model with the full instrument matrix. In general, the
parameter estimates are not sensitive to the number of lagged instruments
in the estimation. The estimated long run eect of programs is smaller
when the full instrument matrix is used, 0.35 compared to 0.66, but within
the 90 % condence band for the reduced model.
Results when the errors are correlated between municipalities
In the calculation of the standard errors, it is assumed that the errors,
"i;t; in equation (11) are independent between municipalities. This as-
sumption is not valid if shocks to the labor force participation rate in one
municipality aect shocks to the labor force participation rate in other mu-
nicipalities. To account for this possibility, the model is estimated with
26the assumption that municipalities within the same local labor market19
are allowed to have correlated errors, while errors between dierent local
labor markets are uncorrelated.
The model is estimated with an ordinary IV-estimator to examine if
the standard errors are aected. The estimation is carried out in Stata,
using the ivreg command with the cluster option. The reduced model is
estimated in dierences, with lagged levels of the endogenous variables
dated t-2 to t-5 as instruments.20 Table 12 in Appendix B presents the
estimation results. The cluster option, which is used when local labor
markets are allowed to be correlated, is only available with the robust
option in Stata. The robust option calculates the standard errors by down-
weighing the importance of outliers. The p-values are practically the same
for normal and robust standard errors. The signicance of the parameters
do not change when the cluster option is used to calculate the p-values.
So the conclusions do not change when errors are allowed to be correlated
between municipalities in the same local labor market.
Results for dierent sample periods In the estimation it is assumed
that the parameters are constant over time. The preliminary model is
estimated on dierent sub-samples, to examine if the estimates change.
The rst and the last period were gradually deleted from the model. Table
13 in Appendix B presents the estimation results from the second-step
estimation when the sample is divided into two periods, 1989-94 and 1994-
98.21 The estimated coecients, except on open unemployment, are about
the same size as when the whole sample is used. The estimated sum of
the coecients on open unemployment diers between the sample periods.
The estimated long run eect of open unemployment is positive when the
model is estimated during 1994-98. The estimated long term eect of
labor market programs is about the same in the dierent sample periods.
19The denition of local labor markets are based on commuting areas. There are 81
local labor markets.
20The introduction of one more lagged level as instruments is necessary to obtain
parameter estimates that are similar to the GMM-estimates. The estimation period is
1991-98.
21The Sargan statistic does not accept the models. When the estimation periods are
extended to 1989-96 and 1992-98, the models are accepted by the Sargan statistic.
27Results for dierent sizes of municipality populations In the es-
timation it is assumed that the parameters are the same in all munici-
palities. To examine if the estimation results are sensitive to the size of
the population in each municipality, the preliminary model is estimated
excluding municipalities with populations larger than 95 000, 50 000, and
20 000. About 95 %, 85 %, and 57 % of Sweden's population is covered.
Municipalities with populations less than 7 500, 12 500 and 15 000 are
also excluded, leaving samples covering about 90 %, 75 %, and 55 % of
Sweden's population. Table 14 in Appendix B presents the estimation re-
sults excluding larger municipalities and Table 15 presents the estimation
results where the smaller municipalities have been left out.
The point estimates, except for unemployment, do no change when
municipalities with large populations are excluded. The point estimates
of the long run eects of open unemployment vary between -0.12 to -0.19,
which should be compared with -0.33 when the whole sample is used,
indicating that labor force participation in small municipalities could be
less sensitive to municipality unemployment. The point estimated, except
for vacancies, do no change when municipalities with small population
are excluded. The point estimates of the long run eect of municipality
vacancies vary between 0.5 and 1.3, which should be compared with 0.3
when the whole sample is used, indicating larger business cycle variation
in the participation rate in large municipalities.
To summarize, the participation rate could be more pro-cyclical in
large municipalities, because the eect of open unemployment is lower
when large municipalities are excluded and the eect of vacancies is larger
when small municipalities are excluded. The variables in the estimations
are measured at the municipality level. Therefore, larger coecients on
vacancies in municipalities with larger population do not necessarily indi-
cate that the eect is larger. It could be the case that it is, for example,
vacancies at the local labor market, and not at the municipality level as
in the estimation, that matters.
Decomposition of the eect of labor market programs The es-
timated coecients on the number of participants in programs measure
two eects; one positive direct eect from the value of programs and one
indirect negative eect from the number of eective searchers, u+cr. The
parameter c in the theoretical model re
ects dierences in the probability
of getting a job-oer between program participants and open unemployed.
28The two dierent eects could be separated by assigning values of c such
that the number of eective searchers could be calculated. Table 16 in
Appendix B presents estimation results for the reduced model when the
c-parameter is set to 0:5, 1, and 1:5 respectively. The number of eec-
tive searchers, u+cr; should measure the negative competition eect and
the number of program participants, r; should measure the direct posi-
tive eect of programs. The direct and indirect eect are only separated
empirically in the long run because the estimated immediate eect of the
number of eective searchers is positive and not negative as expected. The
estimated long run indirect eect is negative and direct eect is positive.
Table 17 in Appendix B presents the estimated immediate and long run
direct and indirect eects of the number of participants in labor market
programs for dierent values of c; where the coecients on u + cr are
multiplied with the value of c. The total eect of programs is about
the same size as in the estimation where c is unrestricted. The long run
competition eect, calculated from the coecient on u + cr; is increasing
in c, as expected. The estimated long run direct eects of programs are
also larger if programs are more eective, as expected.
Long run eect of labor market programs in the alternative esti-
mations Table 8 presents a summary of the estimated long run eects
of labor market programs in the alternative estimations. In the reduced
model, the estimated long run eect of programs is 0.70, see Table 4. None
of the alternative estimation results in estimated long run eects that are
signicantly dierent from the one obtained in the reduced model. The
point estimates are between 0.35 and 1.02, and most of the point estimates
are close to 0.70. That is, the eect of labor market programs is very robust
to dierent specications and estimation methods. The smallest eect is
obtained when the larger instrument matrix is used. The largest eect is
obtained when the smallest municipalities are excluded from the model.
The estimated long run eect of open unemployment is larger when the
SYS-estimator is used, positive when the model is estimated between 1994-
98, and smaller when municipalities with large population are excluded. It
is dicult to determine the size of the discouraged worker eect, because
the size of the long run eect of open unemployment vary between some
of the dierent estimation methods and models.
29Table 8: Estimated long run eect of labor market programs
Long run eect of programs
Reduced model 0.699
90 % condence band [ 1.081] [ 0.317]
SYS-estimator 0.495
All instruments used 0.348
Sample period 89-94 0.752
Sample period 94-98 0.660
Pop 6 95 000 0.630
Pop 6 50 000 0.731
Pop 6 20 000 0.694
Pop > 7 500 1.022
Pop > 12 500 0.900
Pop > 15 000 0.577
c = 1:0 0.683
c = 1:5 0.723
c = 0:5 0.572
304.3 Comparison with other studies
Large eects from labor market programs are also found in other studies.
Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) use the same kind of data as in this study
but consider a shorter sample period. In their estimation, the implied
short run eect on labor force participation from labor market programs is
around 0.60, which is about the same magnitude as results obtained here.
The estimates in Johansson and Markowski (1995), who use Swedish time
series data between 1970-92, indicate that a 50 % increase of the number
of participants in labor market programs cause an immediate22 increase in
labor force with 27 300 persons, evaluated at the mean of the sample used
here. The eect is smaller than the one obtained here, 43 000 persons; see
Table 7. Wadensj o (1993) obtains the result that a 1 % increase in labor
market programs increases labor force with slightly more than 1 %. This
eect is much larger than the results obtained here, where the long run
elasticity is estimated to 0.02, see Table 6. He notes that the sizes of the
estimated eects are sensitive to the specication of the equation.
5 Discussion of the results
The estimated coecients on labor market programs suggest that they
have relatively large positive long- and short-run eects on the labor force
participation rate. The positive eects from programs are robust against
dierent specications, dierent choices of the instrument matrix, and
dierent estimation methods. The estimated long run eects of programs
in dierent alternative estimations are not signicantly dierent from the
one in the reduced model. Furthermore, the estimated size of the eect of
labor market programs is very robust, most of the point estimates in the
alternative estimations are very close to the result in the reduced model.
The size of the discouraged worker eect is more dicult to determine
because the estimated long run eect of open unemployment dier in some
of the alternative estimations.
The positive eects on the labor force participation rate indicate that
labor market programs reduce business-cycle variation in labor force par-
ticipation because programs are counter-cyclical. The positive long run
eect of programs is larger than the absolute value of the long run eect
22The long run eect from labor market programs is restricted to zero in their esti-
mation.
31of unemployment, so programs counteract the discouraged-worker eect.
A permanent increase in the number of persons in labor market programs
during a downturn in the economy could prevent people from dropping out
of the labor force, because participants who would have left labor force
in the absence of programs are now maybe participating because of the
programs.
In practice, labor market programs have been used to qualify unem-
ployed for new periods of unemployment benets, which causes diculties
in interpreting estimation results. The true eect of labor market pro-
grams on the eective labor supply is probably smaller than the estimated
coecients indicate,because we do not know the extent of dropouts in ab-
sence of labor market programs used for renewal of benets periods.23 And
it should be pointed out that the estimation results do not measure the
eect of programs on the eective labor force, because we do not know
if labor force participants, who choose to participate in the labor force
because of labor market programs, search for jobs to the same extent as
other labor force participants. If they search less, the eect on the eec-
tive labor force will be smaller than the estimated coecient indicates.
Furthermore, the estimated coecients measure the partial eects on the
labor supply, so it is impossible to conclude that an increased number of
participants in labor market program is an eective way to increase labor
force participation. For this to be done, programs' costs, for example,
must be accounted for.
Because labor force participation is increasing in labor market program
participation, the book keeping relation between employment, unemploy-
ment, labor market programs and labor force should not be used when
forecasting the labor market situation. For example, political targets for
open unemployment, which have been used in Sweden, are harder to reach
by increasing the number of participants in labor market programs, be-
cause open unemployment is not reduced by the same amount.
23The benets from the unemployment insurance is larger than the social allowance.
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34A The data
The data set is a panel consisting of yearly observations from 1986 to
1998 for Sweden's municipalities. The dataset includes 3 692 observations
(13 years times 284 municipalities). The advantage with this dataset,
compared to aggregate time series, is that the extreme situation during the
1990s is covered at the same time as the time dimension is suciently large
to capture some business cycle variation, but without having to assume
that the estimated parameters are constant over a long time horizon.
Employment, population by age, and annual labor income are obtained
from Statistics Sweden. Observations on employment and labor income
are based on the RAMS register, and they are measured in November.
Municipality population is measured at the end of December each year.
Data on the number of vacancies, unemployed, and labor market program
participants are obtained from the National Labor Market Board (Ams).
The number of unemployed and participants in programs are available on
monthly basis. The number of vacancies between 1985 and 1990 in Novem-
ber are obtained manually from microches at National Labor Market
Board central archives, and from august 1991 monthly data are obtained
from the National Labor Market Board. Data on employment at the plant
level that are used to calculate the job destruction rate, are obtained from
a database at IFAU. Employment at the plant level is only available in
November.
Employment and wages are only available in November, population
in December, and the other variables each month, except for the number
of vacancies, which have to be obtained manually from microches be-
fore august 1991. November data on vacancies, employment, and labor
market programs are used in the estimation. The use of November data
could be problematic if the seasonal pattern diers so that observations are
not representative. It is likely that the variables have approximately the
same seasonal pattern because all variables are related to the labor mar-
ket. Alternatively, yearly data on vacancies, unemployment and program
participants could be used, assuming that November observations on em-
ployment, wages and job destruction rate are representative for the whole
year. The variations in employment and wages are probably small during
a year, but the variation in the job destruction rate could be large, so that
November observations on job destruction rate is not representative for
the whole year.
35A.1 Summary statistics
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estima-
tion. All variables are divided by the number of persons in the working-age
population. The overall standard deviation is calculated using the total
number of observations (3 692). The overall variability could be divided
into the variability between and within the municipalities. The variation
between the municipalities is calculated as the deviation of the mean over
time for each municipality from the total mean. The variation within
municipalities is calculated as the deviation of each observation in each
municipality from the mean over time in each municipality.
The variability between municipalities is larger than the within vari-
ability for the number of persons between ages 55-65. Both the between
and within variability contribute to total variance in labor force, wages,
and labor market programs. The within variance is larger for vacancies,
open unemployment, and job destruction rate, implying that the dierence
over time is larger than the dierence between municipalities.
36Table 9: Summary statistics of the variables in the estimations
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
lf Overall 0.855 0.037 0.667 0.969
Between 0.020 0.742 0.932
Within 0.030 0.769 0.931
w Overall 6.161 0.823 4.410 13.223
Between 0.626 5.144 10.208
Within 0.536 4.488 9.176
v Overall 0.009 0.006 0.000 0.131
Between 0.003 0.004 0.028
Within 0.006 -0.007 0.123
u Overall 0.051 0.031 0.001 0.144
Between 0.014 0.019 0.105
Within 0.027 -0.009 0.114
r Overall 0.030 0.020 0.002 0.126
Between 0.012 0.007 0.090
Within 0.016 -0.013 0.078
jdr Overall 0.107 0.042 0.028 0.528
Between 0.015 0.067 0.152
Within 0.039 0.018 0.483
p1824 Overall 0.146 0.017 0.099 0.214
Between 0.011 0.119 0.190
Within 0.013 0.100 0.182
p5565 Overall 0.193 0.027 0.101 0.298
Between 0.025 0.123 0.280
Within 0.011 0.153 0.251
37A.2 Plots of data
Figure 2 - Figure 9 show the Box-Whiskers plots of the data. Box-
Whiskers plots presents the time-series pattern together with the distri-
bution over municipalities. The box contains data between 25th to 75th
percentiles, and the line in the box represents the median. Some extreme
observations are dropped in the Figures. For the labor force participation
rate 3 observations that are less than 0.7 are dropped, 11 observations on
vacancies that are greater than 0.4 are dropped, 9 observations on labor
market programs that are greater than 0.1 are dropped, and 4 observations
























































































































































Figure 9: Population ages 55{65 divided by working-age population
42B Results from alternative estimations
Table 10: Estimation results, preliminary model, SYS estimator
First-step estimation Second-step estimation
Variable Coe p-val SE Coe p-val SE
lft 1 0.582 0.000 0.029 0.591 0.000 0.031
lft 2 0.120 0.000 0.026 0.116 0.000 0.027
wt 0.007 0.060 0.004 0.007 0.075 0.004
wt 1 -0.007 0.089 0.004 -0.007 0.107 0.004
wt 2 -0.000 0.737 0.000 -0.000 0.645 0.000
vt 0.060 0.675 0.144 0.062 0.700 0.162
vt 1 0.145 0.086 0.084 0.153 0.096 0.092
vt 2 -0.096 0.090 0.057 -0.121 0.052 0.062
ut 0.333 0.000 0.060 0.347 0.000 0.066
ut 1 -0.559 0.000 0.055 -0.571 0.000 0.063
ut 2 -0.097 0.018 0.041 -0.079 0.074 0.044
rt 0.562 0.000 0.066 0.571 0.000 0.071
rt 1 -0.341 0.000 0.062 -0.373 0.000 0.068
rt 2 -0.064 0.129 0.042 -0.053 0.251 0.046
jdrt -0.109 0.000 0.021 -0.108 0.000 0.021
jdrt 1 -0.013 0.070 0.007 -0.012 0.136 0.008
jdrt 2 -0.001 0.872 0.007 -0.002 0.776 0.007
p1824t 1 -0.350 0.000 0.048 -0.357 0.000 0.052
p5565t 1 -0.110 0.000 0.031 -0.123 0.000 0.034
Sargan 1006 0.000 261 1.000
AR(1) -11.7 0.000 -8.8 0.000
AR(2) 1.8 0.073 1.2 0.214
43Table 11: Estimation results, all available instruments
First-step estimation Second-step estimation
Variable Coe p-val SE Coe p-val SE
lft 1 0.461 0.000 0.028 0.458 0.000 0.035
lft 2 0.046 0.053 0.024 0.048 0.111 0.030
wt 0.003 0.241 0.002 0.003 0.252 0.003
wt 1 -0.001 0.662 0.002 -0.001 0.684 0.003
wt 2 -0.000 0.548 0.000 -0.000 0.452 0.000
vt 0.097 0.360 0.106 0.119 0.388 0.138
vt 1 0.131 0.109 0.082 0.153 0.157 0.108
vt 2 -0.101 0.060 0.054 -0.089 0.256 0.078
ut 0.449 0.000 0.047 0.458 0.000 0.053
ut 1 -0.550 0.000 0.046 -0.549 0.000 0.050
ut 2 -0.071 0.070 0.039 -0.065 0.183 0.049
rt 0.486 0.000 0.052 0.514 0.000 0.064
rt 1 -0.292 0.000 0.052 -0.304 0.000 0.066
rt 2 -0.035 0.391 0.041 -0.038 0.438 0.049
jdrt -0.094 0.000 0.018 -0.092 0.000 0.019
jdrt 1 -0.012 0.070 0.007 -0.014 0.069 0.007
jdrt 2 -0.001 0.801 0.006 -0.002 0.765 0.006
p1824t 1 -0.374 0.000 0.047 -0.354 0.000 0.068
p5565t 1 -0.163 0.000 0.038 -0.174 0.002 0.055
Sargan 1109 0.000 269 1.000
AR(1) -12.0 0.000 -8.8 0.000
AR(2) 3.2 0.001 1.9 0.062
44Table 12: Estimation results, IV-estimator
Variable Coe p-val ordinary p-val robust p-val cluster
lft 1 0.282 0.000 0.001 0.001
lft 2 0.037 0.254 0.318 0.350
wt 0.005 0.405 0.366 0.139
vt 1 0.243 0.034 0.065 0.075
ut 0.883 0.000 0.000 0.000
ut 1 -0.413 0.036 0.032 0.011
ut 2 -0.063 0.227 0.236 0.136
rt 0.712 0.000 0.000 0.001
rt 1 -0.192 0.201 0.197 0.107
jdrt -0.140 0.041 0.057 0.054
jdrt 1 -0.020 0.021 0.023 0.020
p1824t 1 -0.484 0.000 0.000 0.000
p5565t 1 0.132 0.164 0.188 0.131
45Table 13: Estimation results, dierent sample periods
89-94 94-98
Variable Coe p-val Coe p-val
lft 1 0.253 0.000 0.210 0.05
lft 2 0.009 0.845 0.038 0.292
wt 0.006 0.372 0.012 0.094
wt 1 0.008 0.373 -0.016 0.065
wt 2 -0.000 0.195 0.000 0.610
vt 0.149 0.492 0.304 0.304
vt 1 0.185 0.129 0.378 0.163
vt 2 -0.003 0.952 0.013 0.944
ut 0.245 0.091 0.785 0.000
ut 1 -0.571 0.000 -0.147 0.144
ut 2 -0.128 0.097 -0.041 0.479
rt 0.550 0.000 0.624 0.000
rt 1 -0.070 0.549 -0.100 0.337
rt 2 0.075 0.327 -0.027 0.602
jdrt -0.117 -0.000 -0.147 0.000
jdrt 1 -0.016 0.114 -0.022 0.168
jdrt 2 -0.007 0.402 -0.003 0.817
p1824t 1 -0.439 0.000 -0.466 0.000
p5565t 1 -0.203 0.019 -0.096 0.268
Sargan 190 0.005 156 0.005
AR(1) -4.6 0.000 -3.4 0.001
AR(2) 1.5 0.125 0.9 0.370
46Table 14: Estimation results, exclusive of large muncipalities
pop 6 95 000 pop 6 50 000 pop 6 20 000
n = 271 n = 241 n = 161
Variable Coe p-val Coe p-val Coe p-val
lft 1 0.303 0.000 0.273 0.000 0.303 0.000
lft 2 0.022 0.365 0.027 0.323 0.080 0.041
wt 0.008 0.103 0.012 0.040 -0.006 0.573
wt 1 0.000 0.959 0.006 0.433 0.003 0.773
wt 2 -0.001 0.056 0.001 0.766 -0.001 0.850
vt 0.175 0.249 0.102 0.565 0.262 0.241
vt 1 0.138 0.135 0.127 0.203 0.136 0.429
vt 2 -0.034 0.433 -0.067 0.235 -0.017 0.855
ut 0.518 0.000 0.529 0.000 0.632 0.000
ut 1 -0.495 0.000 -0.455 0.000 -0.529 0.000
ut 2 -0.151 0.001 -0.152 0.002 -0.179 0.014
rt 0.625 0.000 0.647 0.000 0.601 0.000
rt 1 -0.177 0.004 -0.120 0.086 -0.164 0.106
rt 2 -0.025 0.581 -0.015 0.763 -0.009 0.903
jdrt -0.121 0.000 -0.108 0.000 -0.075 0.005
jdrt 1 -0.012 0.107 -0.010 0.242 -0.013 0.323
jdrt 2 0.000 0.997 0.001 0.835 0.001 0.902
p1824t 1 -0.340 0.000 -0.291 0.000 -0.327 0.025
p5565t 1 -0.180 0.000 -0.167 0.004 -0.091 0.307
Sargan 246.7 0.616 222.5 0.923 143.8 1.000
AR(1) -7.5 0.000 -7.4 0.000 -5.7 0.000
AR(2) 1.5 0.128 1.4 0.156 0.8 0.441
47Table 15: Estimation results, exclusive of small muncipalities
pop >7 500 pop > 12 500 pop > 15 000
n = 245 n = 175 n = 144
Variable Coe p-val Coe p-val Coe p-val
lft 1 0.390 0.000 0.442 0.000 0.448 0.000
lft 2 0.020 0.463 -0.008 0.814 0.008 0.841
wt 0.007 0.067 0.004 0.141 0.002 0.401
wt 1 -0.004 0.249 0.000 0.959 0.002 0.493
wt 2 -0.000 0.400 -0.000 0.768 0.000 0.736
vt 0.260 0.122 0.496 0.014 0.354 0.116
vt 1 0.097 0.251 0.069 0.427 0.286 0.057
vt 2 -0.058 0.217 0.007 0.903 0.050 0.721
ut 0.482 0.000 0.418 0.000 0.417 0.000
ut 1 -0.595 0.000 -0.461 0.000 -0.522 0.000
ut 2 -0.124 0.011 -0.041 0.465 -0.050 0.483
rt 0.896 0.000 0.647 0.000 0.520 0.000
rt 1 -0.348 0.000 -0.212 0.008 -0.247 0.005
rt 2 0.055 0.298 0.075 0.285 0.041 0.581
jdrt -0.118 0.000 -0.094 0.000 -0.067 0.000
jdrt 1 -0.012 0.125 -0.017 0.056 -0.013 0.158
jdrt 2 0.001 0.854 -0.005 0.433 -0.003 0.672
p1824t 1 -0.462 0.000 -0.495 0.000 -0.532 0.000
p5565t 1 -9,125 0.033 -0.160 0.077 -0.242 0.032
Sargan 227.1 0.887 151.5 1.000 122.2 1.000
AR(1) -7.0 0.000 -6.0 0.000 -5.1 0.000
AR(2) 0.7 0.496 0.6 0.534 -0.3 0.751
48Table 16: Estimation results, dierent assumptions about c
Coe p-val Coe p-val Coe p-val
Variable c=1 c=1.5 c=0.5
lft 1 0.356 0.000 0.357 0.000 0.366 0.000
lft 2 0.038 0.106 0.039 0.095 0.038 0.104
wt 0.004 0.084 0.004 0.081 0.004 0.103
vt 1 0.181 0.040 0.181 0.040 0.191 0.034
ut + crt 0.482 0.000 0.446 0.000 0.475 0.000
ut 1 + crt 1 -0.534 0.000 -0.524 0.000 -0.513 0.000
ut 2 + crt 2 -0.140 0.001 -0.141 0.002 -0.113 0.005
rt 0.156 0.084 - 0.417 0.000
rt 1 0.330 0.000 0.578 0.000 -
rt 2 0.120 0.034 0.188 0.011 -
jdrt -0.124 0.000 -0.125 0.000 -0.126 0.000
jdrt 1 -0.012 0.041 -0.012 0.044 -0.012 0.048
p1824t 1 -0.408 0.000 -0.410 0.000 -0.407 0.000
p5565t 1 -0.153 0.002 -0.151 0.003 -0.162 0.001
Sargan 266.3 0.364 266.0 0.386 265.5 0.410
AR(1) -8.0 0.000 -8.1 0.000 -8.2 0.000
AR(2) 1.4 0.154 1.5 0.133 1.6 0.115
Table 17: The direct and indirect eects of r
u + cr r total
c = 1 immediate 0.482 0.156 0.638
long run -0.317 1.000 0.683
c = 1:5 immediate 0.669 - 0.669
long run -0.545 1.268 0.723
c = 0:5 immediate 0.238 0.417 0.655
long run -0.128 0.700 0.572
unrestricted immediate 0.634
long run 0.699
49